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Abstract

This paper analyzes the determinants of unsatisfying private investment growth in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) throughout the 1980s and 1990. In this period, private
investment in MENA has on average shown a decreasing or stagnant trend in contrast to the rest
of the world. This paper show empirically for a panel of 40 developing economies -- among
which five MENA countries -- that in addition to the traditional determinants of investment -such as the growth anticipations and the real interest rate -- government policies explain MENA's
low investment rate. Insufficient structural reforms represented as poor financial development
and deficient trade openness has been a crucial factor for the deficit in private capital formation.
Economic uncertainties of the region have constituted major deterrent for firms to invest. High
external debt burden and economic volatility arise as primary reasons for high uncertainty in the
region. These findings provide new empirical evidences on the determinants of private investment
in the developing world and in MENA countries in particular.
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1- Introduction
With the liberalization of economies and the acceleration of reforms, private
investment increased throughout the world in the 1990s. The Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) countries followed this pattern but at a slower pace. While private
investment to GDP grew by 7.3 percent in the region, this rate reached 10 percent in
Latin America (LAC) and Africa (AFR), and 16 percent in East Asia (EAP), despite the
financial crisis) [1].
In this paper, we address the question of the low private investment of the MENA
region. For this purpose, we estimate a model of the determinants of private investment
for a panel of 40 countries -- among which five MENA economies [2] (see Appendix 1
for the list of countries). This model determines which factors account for the
performances of the MENA region, and identifies the incentives to be provided to boost
private investment in the future.
Although the importance of private investment has been widely developed in the
literature, little is known -- both theoretically and empirically -- about what induces
private firms to invest in developing countries. In fact, developing countries do not
always operate in a competitive environment and face constraints that are not accounted
for in the neoclassical model. This partly explains why most of the economists do not
agree on the subject of the determinants of investment in the developing countries (see
Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Blejer and Khan, 1984; Serven, 1998). This phenomenon
is also the case for MENA economies, for which the empirical literature is very deficient
(see Shafik, 1992, on Egypt ; Schmidt and Muller, 1992, on Morocco ; Bisat, El-Erian,
El-Gamal and Mongelli, 1998, on MENA).
In this context, the objective of this paper is to extend the previous work on the
determinants of private investment in the developing world, and in MENA economies in
particular. We have first extended the neoclassical accelerator model (Jorgenson, 1963)
by taking into account some specific constraints faced by the developing world. These
constraints can range from financial repression to absence of well functioning financial
markets, foreign exchange shortage, and other distortions associated with foreign
exchange, economic instability, deficiencies in infrastructure, lack of skilled labor and
deficit in structural reforms (see Shafik, 1992, and Agenor and Montiel, 1998).
The current paper also contributes to the literature by increasing the number of
MENA countries studied (five among 40 countries), and the period of time covered
(1973-80 to 1999). We employ panel data econometric techniques which allow some
comparative analysis between the different regions, and among the MENA countries in
particular. Finally, to avoid the problems of multicollinearity caused by the introduction
of a large number of potentially collinear explanatory variables, we make use of
aggregated reforms indicators processed by the mean of principal component analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the model of
private investment tested and the results of the estimations. The third section use this
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model to quantify the impact of economic reforms on the private investment of the
MENA region. The last section concludes.

2. The Econometric Analysis
2-1. The model tested
The equation of investment considered in this paper extends the neoclassical
accelerator model and takes various constraints faced by the investors in developing
countries into account. The model is as follows:

ln(Pr ivi ,t ) = α 0 + α 1 Acci ,t + α 2 ri ,t + α 3 MS i ,t + α 4 SRi ,t −2 + α 5 ES i ,t −1 + α 6Voli ,t
+ α 7 Infrai ,t + ε i ,t

(1)

where ln(Privi,t ):
Private investment as percentage of GDP in logarithm
Acci,t :
Accelerator
ri,t :
Real interest rate
MSi,t
Macroeconomic stability
SRi,t-2 :
Structural reforms
External stability
ESi,,t-1 :
Voli,t :
Macroeconomic volatility
Infrai,t :
Physical infrastructure
α0 :
Intercept and α 1 to α 7 : parameters
i: group index, t : time index, and ε : error term
Acc is the variable chosen to accommodate the neoclassical theory of flexible
accelerator (Jorgenson, 1963). Anticipations of investors -- as far as the economic
environment is concerned -- have been proxied by one lag period of the GDP growth rate
(Growthi,t-1). The investors envision the future economic environment as the growth rate
observed in the past. The reason for taking one lag period of the GDP growth rate is also
to avoid simultaneity problems in estimating the investment equation. This variable is
expected to have a positive coefficient. Moreover, the neoclassical model of investment
takes the user cost of capital into consideration. The current paper incorporates the real
interest rate (r) to capture this effect. A negative sign of the coefficient is expected
( α 2 < 0 ).
SR, MS, and ER stand for the indicators of structural reforms, macroeconomic and
external stability respectively. These indicators have been constructed by means of
principal component analysis. Reform and stability indicators are expected to have a
positive impact on private investment ( 3, 4 and 5 > 0).
Structural reforms constitute an important determinant of the actual and future
profitability of private investment. The structural reforms index (SR) incorporates an
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indicator of trade policy (TradePGDP) -- calculated as the as the ratio of exports plus
imports to GDP, from which we have deducted the exports of oil and mining products, as
well as the “natural” openness of the economy generated by Frankel and Romer (1999) -and the private credit by deposit money banks and other institutions as percentage of
GDP (PCrGDP) -- as a proxy for the development of the banking system. The financial
development provides more opportunities and incentives for the firms to invest.
Developed financial systems mobilize and allocate resources for the firms to undertake
investment projects. A developed financial system is also expected to be more efficient
due to an increasing technological specialization, which leads to a better selection of
projects and a more advanced diversification of risks. This allows the firms to finance
more investment projects and increases the productivity of new investments (see Levine,
1997, for a synthesis). Trade reforms constitute another factor that can stimulate private
investment. Trade openness increases competitiveness and provides access to enlarged
markets (Balassa, 1978; Feder, 1982). Trade openness can be at the origin of economies
of scale and of productivity gains. All these factors create favorable conditions for the
enterprises to invest.
Macroeconomic stability is an important part of the investment climate of a
country. Macroeconomic stability provides a more reliable economic environment, which
enables the investors to benefit from the existing profit opportunities (Faini and de Melo,
1992; Larrain and Vergara, 1993; Servén and Solimano, 1993). The macroeconomic
stability indicator (MS) is based on inflation (p), public deficit as a percentage of GDP
(PubDef) and foreign exchange parallel market’s premium (lBmp, in logarithm). High
inflation rates -- in addition to raising the cost of long-term financing -- are expected to
adversely affect private investment by increasing the risk associated with long-term
investment projects. Similarly, black market premium and budget deficit can lead to
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances and sudden economic policy reversals, which
are likely to affect the profitability of long-term investment.
Similar to macroeconomic stability, external stability constitutes an integral part
of the investment decision for the enterprises, due to providing a more predictable
economic environment. The external stability indicator (ES) takes into account the
external debt as a percentage of GDP (DebGDP), as well as of exports of goods and
services (DebEx), and the current account balance as a percentage of GDP (CurGDP).
The ratios of external debt represent the risk for an economy to encounter difficulties in
reimbursing its foreign debt and to face a financial crisis. The presence of a large external
debt can also adversely affect investment by reducing the funds available to invest, given
that the return from new investments must be used to repay the existing debt (Cohen,
1994). The current account ratio indicates the fragility of the external position of the
country (Fitzgerald, 1994).
The economic volatility is another factor that can be disruptive to private
investment. Volatility may lead the investors to seek profit opportunities in short-term
portfolio investments rather than investing in long term productive projects -- especially
when the investment contains more irreversible features (Pindyck, 1991). The
macroeconomic volatility indicator (Vol) is based here on the volatility of GDP growth. It
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is defined as the five-year moving standard deviation of this variable (StdGDP5).
Increased volatility is expected to decrease private investment ( 6 < 0).
Physical infrastructure can be seen as a complementary factor of private
investment. Physical infrastructure stimulates private capital formation by raising the
profitability of investment (Barro, 1990). The physical infrastructure indicator (Infra)
incorporates the logarithm of the density of the road network (lRoads, in km per km2)
and the number of telephone lines per 1,000 people (lTel ). The expected sign of the
coefficient is positive ( 7 >0).
Data on private investment are issued from the Global Development Network
Database of the World Bank. Inflation and interest rates come from the International
Financial Statistics of IMF [3]. Data on all other disaggregate variables are from World
Development Indicators of the World Bank. Aggregate indicators of infrastructure,
structural reforms, external and macroeconomic stability are from Nabli and VéganzonèsVaroudakis (2004).

2-2. Estimation Results
The first step of our estimation analyses the degree of integration of the variables
of Equation (1). This test determines the existence of a long-term relationship between
private investment and its determinants. Given that the correlation between dependent
and independent variables suffer from the issue that these variables follow a common
trend, the relationship estimated in this case would be biased.
To account for this potential bias, table 2 in Appendix 2 provides the results of the
Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the data of our sample. We have used the Im,
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) methodology, which provides critical values of ADF tests in the
case of heterogeneous panel data [4]. The results indicate that the series are generally
stationary at the 1 percent level. The exception is structural reforms, which are stationary
at the 10 percent level. These results allow running Equation (1) by using the standard
estimation methods [5].

Equation (1) then describes the long-run relationship between private investment
and a number of economic variables. Equation (1) has been estimated on an unbalanced
panel of 40 developing countries from 1973-80 to 1999. The results of the regressions -using the White estimator to correct for the heteroscedasticity bias -- are presented in
Table 1. To control for the sample heterogeneity, we have introduced country dummy
variables. These variables reflect differences in the quality of institutions or endowments
of natural resources, which can be at the origin of large discrepancies in the “natural
propensity” to invest [6]. This hypothesis is supported by the data as shown by the value
of the Fischer tests of equality of the intercepts across countries, as well as by the value
of the Hausman tests as far as the random hypothesis is concerned. The regressions fit the
data quite well, accounting for 62 to 65 percent of the variations of the investment ratio
across countries and overtime.

4

In the estimations, almost all explanatory variables exhibit a significant impact on
private investment, with the exception of macroeconomic stability and of infrastructures
whose results are not reported here (Table 1). The accelerator variable (Acc) has the
expected positive sign, which implies that anticipations of economic growth induce more
investment. Similarly, interest rate (r) appears to exert a negative effect on a firm’s
investment projects, which is consistent with the user cost of capital theory.

Table 1: Estimation Results of the Long-term Private Investment Equations
Dependent Variable ln(PRIV)

Independent Variables

Coef.

t-stat.

Acci,t
ri,t
SRi,t-2
ESi,t-1
StdGDP5i,t

0.02

-4.4

-0.06

-2.7

0.12

-5

0.08

-2.8

-0.02
CHISQ(5) :9.7
41
717
0.65
F(45,671): 72.5

-1.8

Hausman Test
No. of Countries
No. of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-stat. in Fixed
Effects Estimation

Sources: the data have been compiled from the World Development Indicators and the Global Development
Network Database (World Bank), and the IMF International Financial Statistics. Aggregated indicators (SR
and ES) are issued of Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis 2004). All coefficients are significant at 5 percent
level. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics

More interestingly, structural reforms (SR) and external stability (ES) enhance the
private investment decisions. This confirms that firms in developing countries face other
constraints than in more developed ones. Higher degree of trade openness and higher
financial deepening increase private capital formation. Quantitatively -- holding other
variables fixed -- one standard deviation improvement in structural reforms stimulates
private investment by 0.29 percent (.12 X .025). External stability (ES) constitutes also an
important determinant of private investment. The impact of one standard deviation is 0.24
percent (.08 X .031) on the private investment ratio. An interesting result is that the
effects of both variables (SR and ES) are not instantaneous, respectively in two-year and
one-year lags. This result indicates that investment decisions require reforms to be
consolidated and economic environment to be more stable before materializing into real
projects.
Our estimation also reveals the negative impact of macroeconomic volatility -calculated as a five-year moving standard deviation of GDP growth, StdGDP5 -- on
private investment decisions. This result is consistent with the findings of Aizenman and
Marion (1999) [7]. This may present new empirical evidence to support the view that the
5

impact of volatility on economic performance is not trivial. This finding -- together with
the role of structural reforms (SR) and of external stability (ES) -- confirms that a stable
and sound investment climate is crucial for stimulating private investment.
Our estimation failed, however, to highlight the role of macroeconomic stability
and of infrastructure on the firms’ decision to invest. This conclusion is always the case
regardless of the measures tried (composite or disaggregated indicators). This does not
mean, however, that these factors do not constitute real determinants of private
investment. Actually, other studies have shown the importance of both factors on private
capital formation (see Fischer, 1993, and Greene and Villanueva, 1991, for
macroeconomic stability and Blejer and Khan 1984, for infrastructure). Furthermore, the
lack of strong evidence in favor of macroeconomic stability can be due to the significance
of the volatility indicator, when calculated as the standard deviation of inflation, which
may incorporate some elements of macroeconomic stability.

3. Contribution of Economic Reforms to the Private Investment of
the MENA Countries
As mentioned earlier, using aggregate indicators overcomes the difficulties of
estimating the impact of a large number of indicators that may have collinear
relationships. This method also allows for subsequent calculations of the contribution of
the initial indicators to the investment performance of the countries. In this section, we
use our estimated equation to calculate the coefficients of the disaggregated variables (see
Table 2) [8].A number of conclusions can be drawn from these calculations.
First, the structural reform emerges to be an important explanatory variable of
private capital formation. Financial system’s development shows a strong impact on the
firms’ decisions to invest (coefficient 0.41). This means that making the funds available
to the private sector to invest is a priority. Trade openness also comes to be a key variable
in stimulating private investment (coefficient 0.23).
External stability represents another sector of reform, which is conducive to
private investment. Progress in the current account balance shows an impact as high as
financial development (coefficient 0.43). External debt to GDP, also, discourages private
capital formation (coefficient -0.16).

Table 2: Structural Reforms and External Stability
Estimated Coefficients (Benchmark Equation)
Index

Variables

Short Term coefficients
Standardized
Variables
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Level
Variables

ES

SR

DebGDP
DebExX
CurGDP
TradePGDP

-0.067
-0.066
0.047
0.095

-0.16
-0.04
0.43
0.23

PCrGDP

0.095

0.41

Source: Authors'calculation.

All together, real progress in structural reforms and external stability in MENA
would help private investment to catch up with other more advanced regions, East Asia in
particular. In fact, the MENA countries have been characterized with low trade openness,
modest level of financial development, high external debt, slow growth, and high
volatility in the last two decades (see Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis 2004). On the
contrary, the East Asia and Pacific region has witnessed remarkable progress in structural
reforms and external stability, together with high rate of growth, low volatility of the
economy, and outstanding performances in terms of private investment.

Table 3. Private Investment to GDP in the 1990s

Increase with improvement in
Int.
Actual Str. Reforms Ext. Stability Growth Rate Vol. Sub-Total Potential (a) Fixed Effects Potential (b)
(% GDP)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%) (%)
(%)
(% GDP)
(%)
(% GDP)
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Morocco
Tunisia

11.1
18.1
25.9
11.7
13.7

25
31
9
25
14
21

1.1
-3.2
11.9
3.9
2.6
3.3

2.8
2.3
5.0
6.2
2.4
3.7

1.2
2.1
1.8
0.9
1.5

-3.3
0.7
3.7
4.3
-1.3
2.3

28
30
26
35
19

MENA
16.1
31.8
Note: (a) is the sum of columns 1 to 6 ; (b) adds the impact of the fixed effects.

14.3
23.5
32.7
15.8
16.2
21.2

48

21.1

13
28
28
29

36.8
20.2
20.8

Following this analysis, we have quantified how much the lack of reform, external
instability, and volatility in the region have contributed to discourage firms to invest. To
this end, we have taken the East Asian countries as reference and calculated the level of
private investment that MENA could have reached if the region had undertaken the same
level of reform and had faced the same economic conditions -- external stability,
volatility, and economic growth -- as the East Asian countries. Our calculations focus on
the 1990s. The results are presented in Table 3.
The structural reforms, because of their strong impact on private investment, and
their clear deficit in most MENA countries, appear to be a key factor as far as firms’
decisions to invest are concerned. Our calculation shows that the firms would have
invested 21 percent more during the 1990s, if MENA region had the same trade openness
and financial development than East Asia. This increase would even have been higher in
Iran (31 percent) because of the low financial depth and trade diversification, and in
Egypt and Morocco (25 percent), due to the weak financial development. These results
highlight the substantial contribution of the deficit in structural reforms for the low
private capital accumulation of the 1990s.
7

26.4

As far as external stability is concerned, the high debt burden of MENA
economies has also contributed, however less, to the slow private capital formation in the
region. A more stable external environment, like in East Asia, would have stimulated
investment decisions in average by 3.3 percent in the 1990s. In Jordan, the critical
external situation has caused a deficit in investment by 12 percent. Iran is the only
country with a lower external debt ratio than East Asia (see negative sign of the
contribution in Table 3) [9].
Volatility of the activity has also been another concern for the region. A more
stable economic environment would have definitely encouraged firms to realize more
investment projects, which could have been increased by 2.3 percent on average for the
region and even more in Jordan and Iran (3.7 and 4.3 percent, respectively).
A reason of the low private investment in MENA can also be seen in the slow
economic growth compared to East Asia. This situation has constituted a negative signal
for the enterprises to invest and decreased private investment by 3.7 percent during the
1990s. Morocco and Jordan have been affected more by the weak economic
performances in the 1990s. Despite a relatively low impact, this result constitutes another
argument in favor of reforms, which can also boost investment through their impact on
growth. Finally, interest rates are higher than in other regions -- East Asia in particular.
However, this higher interest rates have played a marginal role in the low capital
formation in MENA countries.
In total, the private investment decisions would have increased by 31.8 percent
and the investment ratio would have reached 21.2 percent of GDP -- instead of 16.1
percent, (see Table 3), if MENA had the same economic conditions as East Asia in the
1990s. Especially, Egypt and Jordan are of concern because of their deficiencies in
reforming their economies.
In the MENA region, however, investment ratio remains on average inferior as
compared to East Asia. This low ratio is due to the fact that reform and stabilization
efforts pay less in the MENA region. Fixed effects are, on average, smaller in the MENA
countries than in East Asia [10] (see Table 3). Hence MENA countries appear to be
characterized by unexplained factors, which are not always favorable to private
investment. These factors have contributed on average to deter firms’ decisions to invest
by 29 percent in the 1990s. This percentage has even been higher in Egypt (37 percent). If
MENA countries had the same fixed effects as East Asia, private investment would have
reached 26 percent of GDP in the 1990s.

4. Conclusion
In this paper, it has been shown that economic reforms, in addition to economic
environment, greatly affect private entrepreneurs’ decision to invest. In this regard, our
results are in line with the conclusions of Greene and Villanueva (1991), Blejer and Khan
(1984), and Serven (1998).
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In MENA, the lack of economic reforms and the deficiencies of the economic
environment explain well the deficit in private investment. This has been particularly the
case for structural reforms, which were lacking in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, private
investment would have been increased by 29 percent in the 1990s, if the MENA region
had benefited from the same level of trade policy and financial development as in East
Asia. This percentage would have even been higher in Morocco (around 35 percent) due
to a weak financial development and in Iran (around 30 percent) because of the low
financial depth and trade diversification.
Same conclusions can be drawn for external stability and volatility. An
improvement of the debt burden and a more stable economic activity, similar to East
Asia, would have stimulated private firms’ investment by respectively 3.3 percent and 2.3
percent in the 1990s.
Our findings confirm that the lack of economic reforms remains a problem for a
majority of MENA countries, which have failed to raise the rate of growth of their
economy (Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2004), as well as the productivity and the
competitiveness of their enterprises (Dasgupta et al., 2002). This conclusion is even more
critical in the context of high growth of the labor participation which asks for a
substantial capital formation in order to better confront with unemployment in the MENA
region (World Bank, 2004).
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Notes
[1] These calculations are based on a sample of 81 developing countries between 1970 and 1999.
[2] The MENA countries studied have been determined by the availability of data.
[3] The “ideal” interest rate should be the real lending rate. Unfortunately, its availability is quite
limited in terms of both time and group dimensions. To avoid selection bias and expand our
coverage, we decided to use the nominal bank discount rate deflated by inflation to construct the
real interest rate series. The real interest rate is calculated as ln (1+i)/1+π)*100.
[4] When testing for unit roots, we assume that the disturbances in the underlying ADF
regressions are serially correlated following an AR(1) process. The proper test inspected, hence,
is standardized t-bar statistic, which adjusts the average t-statistic across countries by their
individual means and variances.
[5] This is also the case because our sample is sufficiently “big” with T (number of time periods)
and N (number of countries) being large enough (see Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 1997). In this case,
tests’ distribution tends to converge.
[6] This applies in particular to the oil and mining producing economies of our sample of
countries.
[7] In Aizenman and Marion (1999), volatility measures are based on the standard deviations of
government consumption as a share of GDP, of nominal monetary growth, and of real exchange
rate.
[8] The calculation is based on the estimated coefficients of the aggregate indicators in the
regression, as well as on the weights of each principal component in the aggregate indicator
combined with the loading of the initial variables in each principal component (see Nabli and
Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2004).
[9] This is due to the fact that -- because of its political circumstances -- Iran could not receive
long term loans in the international financial markets.
[10] Note that the fixed effects are country specific. They are the intercepts of the regression.
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Appendix 1
List of countries of the sample

Africa
Cote d'
Ivoire
Cameroon
Gabon
Ghana
Gambia, The
Kenya
Madagascar
Mauritius
Malawi
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Togo
South Africa
Zambia

Latin
America

South East
Asia

Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Guatemala
Peru
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela

China
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
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South Asia

MENA

Bangladesh
India
Sri Lanka
Pakistan

Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Morocco
Tunisia

Appendix 2
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF)

Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Tests
Variables
ln(Priv)
Acc
Gap5
GapHP
r
SR
ES
StdInf5
Residuals of Estimation:
Benchmark
Specification 2
Specification 3
Specification 4
Specification 5
Specification 6

t-bar stat. critical value ADF test
-2.52
-1.74*
I(0)
-4.97
-1.73*
I(0)
-5.20
-1.73*
I(0)
-5.90
-1.73*
I(0)
-2.56
-1.82*
I(0)
-0.77
-1.69***
I(0)
-1.84
-1.82*
I(0)
-1.27
-1.64***
I(0)
-2.52
-2.28
-2.26
-2.55
-2.51
-2.30

-1.97*
-1.97*
-1.97*
-1.97*
-1.97*
-2.14*

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)
I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

Note: Data are compiled from World Development Indicators, Global Development
Network, and IMF International Financial Statistics. All unit root tests are augmented
by 1 period lag. Critical values are from Im, Pessaran, and Shin (2003), with *, **,
and *** indicating 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
Source: Authors'estimations
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